Betrayal in politics (in Links)

Unappreciated Misnomer November 9 2012 6:22 PM EST

I like the comment on this article - I don't understand all the ire, are campaign donors so obtuse as to NOT realize that the person or party that they're donating to might lose? It's an election, not a fortune 500 company...

Admindudemus [jabberwocky] November 9 2012 11:39 PM EST

it appears you are confusing donors with campaign workers, people employed for a job who find that their expense accounts were cut short before they even made it home from their big night.

prudent yes, right? probably not.

Fishead November 9 2012 11:46 PM EST

I wish my employer paid for my drive home.

Sickone November 10 2012 3:56 AM EST

it appears you are confusing donors with campaign workers

Nope, he's not.
Further down in the article it mentions ANGRY big money DONORS "unloading" on people linked to the campaign, from staffers of the campaign, leaders of superpacs, to Mittens himself... apparently believing that they were BUYING a win, not supporting a bid to maybe win, and that the loss was due to somebody that somehow "screwed up", not to the fact their candidate was junk to begin with and barely managed an almost equal with all that heavy-duty support.
Newsflash, wealthy people, money really can't buy every specific thing JUST YET.

Sickone November 10 2012 4:14 AM EST

P.S. Typical contributor:


Trump began with: 'Well, back to the drawing board!'
He quickly followed up with a call to revolution. The Trump wrote: 'He lost the popular vote by a lot and won the election. We should have a revolution in this country!' - before deleting the tweet.
***NOTE--he didn't lose the popular vote, btw, he won by over 3 mil extra--ENDNOTE***
But he was far from over. 'This election is a total sham and a travesty,' he wrote. 'We are not a democracy! He added America is in 'serious and unprecedented trouble like never before'.
The 66-year-old later went onto attack the Electoral College, but offered a kernel of hope for the still-Republican House of Representatives.
ムHopefully the House can hold our country together for four more years,メ Trump tweeted.
ムHouse shouldnメt give anything to Obama unless he terminates Obamacare.メ He did not tweet anything after Romney's gracious concession speech.
Trumpメs attacks on Obama have been more frequent in the weeks preceding the election.
Only last week, he lashed out at the commander-in-chief for using Superstorm Sandy to garner more votes and essentially buy the election.

More funny angry republican donor reactions:


When it became clear about midnight that President Barack Obama was safely on the way to re-election, a handful of cranky and inebriated Republican donors wandered about Romney's election night headquarters, angrily demanding that the giant television screens inside the ballroom be switched from CNN to Fox News, where Republican strategist Karl Rove was making frantic, face-saving pronouncements about how Ohio was not yet lost.


Romney lost embarrassingly among young people, African-Americans and Hispanics, a brutal reminder for Republicans that their party is ideologically out of tune with fast-growing segments of the population.
Obama crushed Romney among Hispanic voters by a whopping 44 points, a margin of victory that likely propelled the president to victories in Nevada, Colorado and possibly Florida.
The stunning defeat alarmed Republicans who fear extinction unless the party can figure out how to temper the kind of hardline immigration rhetoric that Romney delivered during his Republican primary bid.
With some of them double-fisting beers and others sipping bourbon, members of Romney's team blamed several factors that were, in some ways, beyond their control.
Many campaign aides pointed the finger at Sandy, the punishing superstorm and October surprise that razed the East Coast and consumed news coverage for what was supposed to be the final full week of campaigning.
There also are very real hard feelings inside the Romney camp about the way New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie, a Republican, seemed to lavish praise on Obama in the wake of Sandy's destruction, allowing Obama to appear bipartisan just as Romney was attacking him for being petty and partisan.
"He didn't have to bear hug the guy," complained one Romney insider.
"It won't be forgotten easily," grumbled another about Christie.
Republicans outside the campaign began pointing fingers at the team.
Some social conservatives were quick to rip open barely healed wounds, claiming that Romney's squishy positions on abortion and same-sex marriage -- closely scrutinized during both of his Republican primary campaigns -- left grass-roots Republicans uninspired.
"What was presented as discipline by the Romney campaign by staying on one message, the economy, was a strategic error that resulted in a winning margin of pro-life votes being left on the table," said Marjorie Dannenfelser, president of the anti-abortion Susan B. Anthony List.
Some wondered aloud about the selection of Rep. Paul Ryan of Wisconsin as Romney's running mate, suggesting that a Republican from a more winnable battleground state might have made a difference.

From the same article, a more detailed explanation which actually MIGHT give some logic to the anger of those donors.


But an adviser to one prominent Republican governor who campaigned for Romney said the campaign's problems were more fundamental.
"Obama ran a very smart but very small campaign, which he could afford to do because he was running against a very small opponent," this Republican said. "The fundamentals of the election were the same all along, and they were this: When there's an incumbent no one wants to vote for, and a challenger that no one wants to vote for, people will vote for the incumbent. At no point did Romney give people any reason to vote for him, and so they didn't."
Democrats showed decisively that their ground game -- the combined effort to find, persuade and turn out voters -- is devastatingly better than anything their rivals have to offer.
In 2004, Republicans tapped the science of microtargeting to redefine campaigns. That is now ancient history.
"When it comes to the use of voter data and analytics, the two sides appear to be as unmatched as they have ever been on a specific electioneering tactic in the modern campaign era," Sasha Issenberg, a journalist and an expert in the science of campaigning, wrote just days before the election proved him right. "No party ever has ever had such a durable structural advantage over the other on polling, making television ads, or fundraising, for example."
The Romney campaign and the Republican National Committee entered Election Day boasting about the millions of voter contacts -- door knocks and phone calls -- they had made in all the key states.
Volunteers were making the calls using an automated VOIP-system, allowing them to dial registered voters at a rapid clip and punch in basic data about them on each phone's keypad, feeding basic information into the campaign's voter file.
But volunteer callers were met with angry hang-ups and answering machines just as much as actual voters on the other end of the line. It was a voter contact system that favored quantity over quality.
At the same time, the campaign's door-to-door canvassing effort was heavily reliant on fired-up but untrained volunteers.
Obama organizers, meanwhile, had been deeply embedded in small towns and big cities for years, focusing their persuasion efforts on person-to-person contact.
The more nuanced data they collected, often with handwritten notes attached, were synced nightly with their prized voter database in Chicago.
After the dust had cleared, the GOP field operation, which had derided the Obama operation and gambled on organic Republican enthusiasm to push them over the top, seemed built on a house of cards.
"Their deal was much more real than I expected," one top Republican with close ties to the Romney campaign said of the Obama field team.
Sources involved in the GOP turnout effort admitted they were badly outmatched in the field by an Obama get-out-the-vote operation that lived up to their immense hype -- except, perhaps, in North Carolina, where Romney was able to pull out a win and Republicans swept to power across the state.
Multiple Romney advisers were left agog at the turnout ninjutsu performed by the Obama campaign, both in early voting and on Election Day.
Not only did Obama field marshals get their targeted supporters to the polls, they found new voters and even outperformed their watershed 2008 showings in some decisive counties, a remarkable feat in a race that was supposed to see dampened Democratic turnout.
Romney officials had modeled an electorate that looked something like a mix of 2004 and 2008, only this time, Democratic turnout would be depressed, and the most motivated voters would be whites, seniors, Republicans and independents.
The share of the national white vote would decline as it has steadily in every election since 1992. There would be modest upticks in Hispanic and African-American voter registration, shifts that would overwhelmingly favor the president. And Obama's get-out-the-vote operation was vastly more sophisticated than the one being run by Romney and the Republican National Committee.
This thread is closed to new posts. However, you are welcome to reference it from a new thread; link this with the html <a href="/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg.tcl?msg_id=003Jwz">Betrayal in politics</a>